Emiel Awad (@emielawad) 's Twitter Profile
Emiel Awad

@emielawad

Political Economist | Economics Consulting. Previously @ Princeton, LSE, University of Rochester ⳥🇳🇱🇪🇬

ID: 154634666

linkhttps://emielawad.com calendar_today11-06-2010 19:57:16

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TheoreticalEconomics (@econtheory) 's Twitter Profile Photo

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We formalise this question and show that the answer has a deadline structure. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We formalise this question and show that the answer has a deadline structure. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…
Ruben Hassid (@rubenhssd) 's Twitter Profile Photo

BREAKING: Apple just proved AI "reasoning" models like Claude, DeepSeek-R1, and o3-mini don't actually reason at all. They just memorize patterns really well. Here's what Apple discovered: (hint: we're not as close to AGI as the hype suggests)

BREAKING: Apple just proved AI "reasoning" models like Claude, DeepSeek-R1, and o3-mini don't actually reason at all.

They just memorize patterns really well.

Here's what Apple discovered:

(hint: we're not as close to AGI as the hype suggests)
Andrew Granato (@agranato42) 's Twitter Profile Photo

NEW PAPER: Expert Asymmetry. When there is a "battle of the experts," civil procedure rules mean that defendants will spend more on expert witnesses. In a decade of handcollected securities litigation data, Ds spend 37% more per hour on economist experts (avg of $1,150 per hour).

NEW PAPER: Expert Asymmetry. When there is a "battle of the experts," civil procedure rules mean that defendants will spend more on expert witnesses. In a decade of handcollected securities litigation data, Ds spend 37% more per hour on economist experts (avg of $1,150 per hour).
Econometrica (@ecmaeditors) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Econometric analysis typically ignores researcher incentives. This article frames experimental data analysis as a mechanism-design problem, showing how unbiased estimation and sample splitting can resolve conflicts of interest. econometricsociety.org/publications/e…

Econometric analysis typically ignores researcher incentives. This article frames experimental data analysis as a mechanism-design problem, showing how unbiased estimation and sample splitting can resolve conflicts of interest. econometricsociety.org/publications/e…
Benjamin Schoefer (@schoefer_b) 's Twitter Profile Photo

New paper: "What Does Consulting Do?" w/ Gert Bijnens, Simon Jäger Consulting is a storied but opaque industry. Our VAT-based B2B data permit the 1st comprehensive study: Which firms buy consulting? What happens when they do? nber.org/papers/w34072 eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/scho…

New paper:

"What Does Consulting Do?"

w/ Gert Bijnens, <a href="/simon_jaeger/">Simon Jäger</a>

Consulting is a storied but opaque industry.
Our VAT-based B2B data permit the 1st comprehensive study:

Which firms buy consulting?
What happens when they do?

nber.org/papers/w34072
eml.berkeley.edu/~schoefer/scho…
Anna Matson (@annarmatson) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Who needs cable when you can watch Congress for free? Senator Josh Hawley introduced his bill to ban stock trading and the room LIT up. You won’t want to miss this recap 🍿 🧵

Who needs cable when you can watch Congress for free? 

Senator Josh Hawley introduced his bill to ban stock trading and the room LIT up. 

You won’t want to miss this recap 🍿 🧵
Yale Department of Economics (@yaleeconomics) 's Twitter Profile Photo

How do people update their views when they suspect news coverage to be tainted by manipulation? In the latest Econometrica, Ricardo Alonso & Gerard Padró I Miquel propose a model on the competitive capture of public opinion. Read the full article here: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/EC…

How do people update their views when they suspect news coverage to be tainted by manipulation?

In the latest Econometrica, Ricardo Alonso &amp; Gerard Padró I Miquel propose a model on the competitive capture of public opinion. 

Read the full article here: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/EC…
Econometrica (@ecmaeditors) 's Twitter Profile Photo

We show a long-run player who repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions can sometimes establish a reputation even when their strategy is not identified. Our result applies to games of deterrence, delegation, signaling, and Bayesian persuasion. econometricsociety.org/publications/e…

We show a long-run player who repeatedly observes private signals and takes actions can sometimes establish a reputation even when their strategy is not identified. Our result applies to games of deterrence, delegation, signaling, and Bayesian persuasion. econometricsociety.org/publications/e…
TheoreticalEconomics (@econtheory) 's Twitter Profile Photo

We extend Bayesian persuasion to dynamic environments with Markovian states. Optimal info disclosure trades off current vs. future discounted payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies and characterize when the asymptotic value hits its upper bound econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

We extend Bayesian persuasion to dynamic environments with Markovian states. Optimal info disclosure trades off current vs. future discounted payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies and characterize when the asymptotic value hits its upper bound econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…
Econometrica (@ecmaeditors) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Economic outcomes often depend on the distribution of some maximum value (eg highest valuation, best idea, lowest cost). If the average number of options is large, how do such outcomes change when some agents have more options than others? Sephorah Mangin econometricsociety.org/publications/e…

Economic outcomes often depend on the distribution of some maximum value (eg highest valuation, best idea, lowest cost). If the average number of options is large, how do such outcomes change when some agents have more options than others? <a href="/SephorahMangin/">Sephorah Mangin</a> econometricsociety.org/publications/e…
Econometrica (@ecmaeditors) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Criminal organizations hinder development. In El Salvador, US deportations seeded gangs whose territorial borders trap residents. Those inside have lower income, education, and well-being than neighbors just 50m away, mainly due to restricted mobility. econometricsociety.org/publications/e…

Criminal organizations hinder development. In El Salvador, US deportations seeded gangs whose territorial borders trap residents. Those inside have lower income, education, and well-being than neighbors just 50m away, mainly due to restricted mobility. econometricsociety.org/publications/e…
Renaud Foucart (@renaudfoucart) 's Twitter Profile Photo

How do you convince the most and least skilled people to team up together in organizations? And why would you want to do something like that in the first place? Answer in our paper forthcoming in European Economic Review and in this thread. (1/12)

How do you convince the most and least skilled people to team up together in organizations? And why would you want to do something like that in the first place? Answer in our paper forthcoming in European Economic Review and in this thread. (1/12)
Andy Hall (@ahall_research) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Think lobbying and campaign contributions are the key to how companies navigate American politics? Wrong. Corporate policy teams are where the real action is! Our new paper offers the first ever systematic, quantitative study of corporate policy teams, based on LinkedIn data on

Think lobbying and campaign contributions are the key to how companies navigate American politics? Wrong. Corporate policy teams are where the real action is!

Our new paper offers the first ever systematic, quantitative study of corporate policy teams, based on LinkedIn data on
Emiel Awad (@emielawad) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Want to know more about the dynamic relationships between lobbyists and politicians? My paper with Gleason Judd and Nicolas Riquelme, Learning by Lobbying, is published online! onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aj…

AJPS (@ajps_editor) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Learning by lobbying by Emiel Awad, Gleason Judd, and Nicolás Riquelme is now available in Early View. @Emielawad Nicolas Riquelme ajps.org/2025/11/03/lea…

Learning by lobbying by Emiel Awad, Gleason Judd, and Nicolás Riquelme is now available in Early View. @Emielawad <a href="/nicriquelme7/">Nicolas Riquelme</a> ajps.org/2025/11/03/lea…