🙏🙏 I don’t think it would, for the reasons you’ve mentioned. But it would have been easy to capture the HRB scenario by expanding the good-faith cooperation requirement in 489-a to a standstill provision. As 489-a has apparently been dropped, the law will have much less impact.

I follow the analysis & agree on the importance of rules - but even after re-reading the paper, I struggle a bit to imagine what exactly the new rules would say. Any chance for the basics to be spelled out in normative language to accelerate the discussion? Brad Setser

Flandreau Schule & Friends had great fun last week workshopping « States of Distress » at Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE @KPatricio_ Vincent Bignon Capitalism: A Journal of History and Economics Damian Clavel Kim Oosterlinck Daniel Reichert-Facilides ❤️❤️❤️❤️ Thanks to all of you

Parallel negotiations with different creditor groups now look like a realistic idea to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process. Here’s how a set of rules for the #CoordinatedFramework proposed by Sean Hagan and Brad Setser might read. 🙏🙏Robin Wigglesworth and FT Alphaville

Favorite quote from a new favorite episode of C&C: ‚Having creditors being able to move first and remove [the] sequential aspect that's been plaguing the sovereign debt restructuring process is another argument that we need some more clarity on the comparability assessment.‘

Not surprising, given the twists and turns of NY sovereign debt bills. Shows that any such legislation must apply irrespective of governing contract law as a matter of public policy to have a real impact. dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4…

Well, it’s always been a legal right, just subject to a higher threshold. But NY lawmakers should indeed take note: If they want to proceed, they should follow the lead of the UK Debt (Dev Cts) Relief Act, which essentially enforced CoT & applies irrespective of governing law.

Heading into New York's 2025 legislative session, it's a good time to review what we learned during the 2023 and 2024 sessions about sovereign debt reforms at the state level. Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government hks.harvard.edu/centers/mrcbg/…

Compelling case for enhanced use of domestic currency debt by emerging market borrowers 👇 #3. could be further expanded to using domestic currency debt as a simplified form of VRIs in sov debt restructurings. That wld also address concerns expressed in imf.org/-/media/Files/… x.com/kpatricio_/sta…

🚨 New Blog! 🚨 Daniel Reichert-Facilides examines key shifts in the FfD4 Outcome Document's paragraph 50 on sovereign debt. Discover what it means for global finance. Read more via link in comments👇 #FfD4 #DevelopmentFinance #Legislation #Finance