Five years after a pandemic that may have originated from a lab, the complete unredacted peer review of EcoHealth's NIH grant remains undisclosed. Transparency is long overdue. Here’s hoping the new administration makes it a priority. Jay Bhattacharya

Grok captured me almost too well.

INCREDIBLE: EcoHealth Alliance nearly secured another $2.5 million grant from USDA for more virus research, just before being federally suspended due to their controversial Wuhan lab experiments. nationalreview.com/news/usda-plan…

Latinne et al's 2020 Nature paper has just been retracted due to data errors. 41 bat CoV sequences from Laos were "erroneously" included according to the authors. Still no word on the 54+ missing sequences. x.com/TheSeeker268/s… nature.com/articles/s4146…

Nothing to see here, just 11,051 pathogen samples funded by US taxpayers sitting in Wuhan’s freezers. (Or maybe it's just 11,050 now). usrtk.org/wp-content/upl…

If you had 11,051 samples and managed to keep 11,050 of them locked away safely, then your safety rate is 99.999%. Amazing! But if that pesky little 0.001% of pathogens that does manage to escape is also one that you engineered to be a pandemic potential pathogen, well, shucks.

An organisation that violated NIH rules, missed SARS2 emergence, and may have indirectly caused a pandemic is now hosting a workshop on emerging pathogens? You can’t make this up.

What's striking is that the Laos samples, despite being part of the NIH grant, were somehow 'erroneously' included in the paper, which anyway only featured RdRp data upto 2016. EHA's year 3 proposal (2017) mentions spike sequencing and additional sampling. Where's the rest of it?

A new study finds that early SARS-CoV-2 strains were more severe & pathogenic than later variants. Using a transgenic mouse model, they found that an early strain caused more weight loss and lung damage than Alpha, Beta, and Gamma variants. pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11…