The Tactic Insider (@taktissimus01) 's Twitter Profile
The Tactic Insider

@taktissimus01

Understand - analyze the science and art of tactics. This account is dedicated to the study of warfare and conflict on the tactical level. RT=food for thought

ID: 914072984213688320

calendar_today30-09-2017 10:22:36

1,1K Tweet

205 Followers

670 Following

Jayson Geroux (@jaysongeroux) 's Twitter Profile Photo

1/2 Short🧵 "Leadership is the spirit, compounded of personality and vision – its practice is an art. Management is of the mind, more a matter of accurate calculation, statistics, methods, timetables, and routine – its practice is a science. ⬇️

Modern War Institute (@warinstitute) 's Twitter Profile Photo

The commanding general of the National Training Center recently described how NTC is incorporating lessons from the Ukraine war into its training. Now he describes six ways units can be prepared to succeed—both at NTC and on the future battlefield. mwi.westpoint.edu/preparing-your…

Daniele 🇺🇦🇬🇧🏴󠁧󠁢󠁳󠁣󠁴󠁿 (@hartreefock) 's Twitter Profile Photo

1/3 After a long work finally I published this piece of research titled "Trench warfare in FPV drone era: an analysis". I could not do this without the help of CJ, Erlend ➡️🌤️ @edrotning.tochnyi.info and Jonathan. The article link is here: tochnyi.info/2024/03/trench…

AirPower 2.0 (MIL_STD) (@airpowernew1) 's Twitter Profile Photo

U.S. Army successfully demonstrated the 150+ km Extended-Range #GMLRS at WSMR. Two ERGMLRS rockets achieved flight trajectory, range & accuracy from launch to impact while engaging a target set. This operational test moves ERGMLRS closer to fielding & production ~ Lockheed Martin

Military Strategy Magazine (@milstrategymag) 's Twitter Profile Photo

ICYMI: New Military Strategy Magazine ‘Exclusive Article’ exploring #Azerbaijan’s recent #military victory over #Armenia in the #NagornoKarabakh confrontation, the utility of conventional #landpower in the 2020s, how it all happened, and what the #war may teach us about

ICYMI: New Military Strategy Magazine ‘Exclusive Article’ exploring #Azerbaijan’s recent #military victory over #Armenia in the #NagornoKarabakh confrontation, the utility of conventional #landpower in the 2020s, how it all happened, and what the #war may teach us about
🪖MilitaryNewsUA🇺🇦 (@front_ukrainian) 's Twitter Profile Photo

⚡️Photo of the construction of fortifications on one of the areas of the front by the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of 🇺🇦Ukraine

⚡️Photo of the construction of fortifications on one of the areas of the front by the engineering troops of the Armed Forces of 🇺🇦Ukraine
David Hambling (@david_hambling) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Uncrewed ground vehicles or UGVs have only played a minor role in this conflict, but that may be changing Ukraine aims to use robots to replace humans on the front line, my take for Forbes - Ukraine Prepares To Roll Out An Army Of Ground Robots Forbes forbes.com/sites/davidham…

Modern War Institute (@warinstitute) 's Twitter Profile Photo

None of the tactical air defense systems currently fielded by the Army are well suited to supporting maneuver elements on the front lines—especially if the enemy attacks with waves of cheap, weaponized drones. mwi.westpoint.edu/the-return-of-…

Zachary Kallenborn (@zkallenborn) 's Twitter Profile Photo

I argue in a new Modern War Institute piece that Drone swarm technology is likely to proliferate globally—perhaps even faster than some high-end exquisite weapons and platforms. But proliferation is likely to be erratic and take place over years or even decades mwi.westpoint.edu/swarm-clouds-o…

Nicholas Drummond (@nicholadrummond) 's Twitter Profile Photo

▶️As drone and missile technologies evolve almost exponentially, we are witnessing a fascinating convergence of UAS, loitering munitions, cruise missiles, and larger RPAS. ▶️There appear to be four categories: 1⃣ 0-10 km / 20 to 30-minute flight time 2⃣ 10-50 km / 60-minute

▶️As drone and missile technologies evolve almost exponentially, we are witnessing a fascinating convergence of UAS, loitering munitions, cruise missiles, and larger RPAS. 
▶️There appear to be four categories:
1⃣ 0-10 km / 20 to 30-minute flight time
2⃣ 10-50 km / 60-minute
Modern War Institute (@warinstitute) 's Twitter Profile Photo

"When General William E. DePuy made his famous 1974 statement—'What can be seen, can be hit. What can be hit, can be killed'—advancements in reconnaissance, surveillance, and target-acquisition capabilities were still in their infancy." mwi.westpoint.edu/the-return-of-…

Samuel Bendett (@sambendett) 's Twitter Profile Photo

1/ QUICK TAKE: Appreciate the thread by Mick Ryan, AM yesterday that highlighted key points in current and future combat UGV development that we can discern form this video. Would like to add the following points as well. Firsts, what we are witnessing is a rapid...

Modern War Institute (@warinstitute) 's Twitter Profile Photo

From Stalingrad to Fallujah and beyond, this episode explores the lessons from nearly a century of urban battles. mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-…

Mick Ryan, AM (@warinthefuture) 's Twitter Profile Photo

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. As the Russians slowly but surely redeploy forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into #Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once

The Ukrainian operation in Kursk is almost one week into execution. As the Russians slowly but surely redeploy forces to seal off the breach in their border and attempt to push the Ukrainians back into #Ukraine, it is worth pondering the options the Ukrainians might have once
Mick Ryan, AM (@warinthefuture) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Throughout the #Ukraine war, adaptation has been a critical national & battlefield function for #Ukraine, and for the Russians. This is a process that pulses & pauses, and is distributed unevenly throughout combat units & the bureaucratic institutions of state. What observations

Throughout the #Ukraine war, adaptation has been a critical national & battlefield function for #Ukraine, and for the Russians. This is a process that pulses & pauses, and is distributed unevenly throughout combat units & the bureaucratic institutions of state. What observations