๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile
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@netresec

Experts in Network Forensics and Network Security Monitoring. Creators of #NetworkMiner, #CapLoader, #PacketCache, #PolarProxy and #RawCap.

ID: 416995874

linkhttps://www.netresec.com/ calendar_today20-11-2011 11:40:57

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RussianPanda ๐Ÿผ ๐Ÿ‡บ๐Ÿ‡ฆ (@russianpanda9xx) 's Twitter Profile Photo

#AutorunStealer is encrypting the config with ChaCha20 and ZLIB compression๐Ÿ‘€ Samples: f29bed66484cb23c58302c62b93fcf7d d89ea4a110c36c13ec46e80d0c9bc2ef 2c03124489072c5e0290f6ef138f39c3 39eda0b2986f484abf3567f2f5e1866d ef0e5882c8bcad3643d51d16c2f5500c

#AutorunStealer is encrypting the config with ChaCha20 and ZLIB compression๐Ÿ‘€

Samples:
f29bed66484cb23c58302c62b93fcf7d
d89ea4a110c36c13ec46e80d0c9bc2ef
2c03124489072c5e0290f6ef138f39c3
39eda0b2986f484abf3567f2f5e1866d
ef0e5882c8bcad3643d51d16c2f5500c
๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Did you know that NetworkMiner parses the #njRAT protocol? The following artefacts are extracted from njRAT C2 traffic: ๐Ÿ–ฅ๏ธ Screenshots of victim computer ๐Ÿ“ Transferred files ๐Ÿ‘พ C2 commands and replies ๐Ÿ”‘ Stolen credentials/passwords โŒจ๏ธ Keylog data netresec.com/?b=2541a39

๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Thank you CISA Cyber, NCSC UK, BSI et al. for publishing the advisory on Russian GRU Targeting Western Logistics Entities and Technology Companies. This list of mocking services is great for threat hunting! infosec.exchange/@netresec/1145โ€ฆ

๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile Photo

CapLoader 2.0 released today! ๐Ÿ”Ž Identifies over 250 protocols in #PCAP ๐ŸŽจ Define protocols from example traffic ๐Ÿ‡ถ Extracts JA3, JA4 and SNI from QUIC ๐Ÿ’ป 10x faster user interface netresec.com/?b=256dbbc

MalwareHunterTeam (@malwrhunterteam) 's Twitter Profile Photo

"cup.msi": eb2688341917d739b2048e39c9913c0c5e0e0d82346757970883c5098a0b77f3 From: https://dnsg-microsoftds-data[.]com/sign/cup.msi configedge-assets[.]org lakes-veteran-mpg-stanford.trycloudflare[.]com comprehensive-cabin-spend-organic.trycloudflare[.]com ๐Ÿค”

"cup.msi": eb2688341917d739b2048e39c9913c0c5e0e0d82346757970883c5098a0b77f3
From: https://dnsg-microsoftds-data[.]com/sign/cup.msi
configedge-assets[.]org
lakes-veteran-mpg-stanford.trycloudflare[.]com
comprehensive-cabin-spend-organic.trycloudflare[.]com
๐Ÿค”
Mohamed Sultan (@msult4n) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Just published a new blog post on how Microsoftโ€™s โ€œMouse Without Bordersโ€ can be abused for data exfiltration & lateral movement. Features KAPE Target, C# scripts, and a BOF as a poc: 0xsultan.github.io/dfir/Exfiltratโ€ฆ

๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile Photo

There's some unknown but interesting C2 to 104.16.0.0/13 (@CloudFlare). C2 domains: ๐Ÿ”ฅevent-time-microsoft[.]org ๐Ÿ”ฅwindows-msgas[.]com ๐Ÿ”ฅevent-datamicrosoft[.]live ๐Ÿ”ฅeventdata-microsoft[.]live Does anyone know malware malware this is? infosec.exchange/@netresec/1147โ€ฆ

๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile Photo

๐Ÿ’ง Dropper connects to legitimate website ๐Ÿ“„ Fake PDF is downloaded over HTTPS ๐Ÿ’พ Fake PDF is decrypted to a #PureLogs DLL โš™๏ธ InstallUtil.exe or RegAsm.exe is started ๐Ÿ’‰ PureLogs DLL is injected into the running process ๐Ÿ‘พ PureLogs connects to C2 server netresec.com/?b=257eead

๐™ฝ๐™ด๐šƒ๐š๐™ด๐š‚๐™ด๐™ฒ (@netresec) 's Twitter Profile Photo

IOCs in blog post: ๐Ÿ“ก 91.92.120.101:62520 ๐Ÿ“ก 91.92.120.101:65535 ๐Ÿ’พ 711d9cbf1b1c77de45c4f1b1a82347e6 ๐Ÿ’พ 6ff95e302e8374e4e1023fbec625f44b ๐Ÿ’พ e6d7bbc53b718217b2de1b43a9193786 ๐Ÿ’พ a9bc0fad0b1a1d6931321bb5286bf6b7 ๐Ÿ’พ 09bb5446ad9055b9a1cb449db99a7302 ๐Ÿ’พ 38d29f5ac47583f39a2ff5dc1c366f7d