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Future AIs might secretly pursue unintended goals — “scheme”. In a collaboration with OpenAI, we tested a training method to reduce existing versions of such behavior. We see major improvements, but they may be partially explained by AIs knowing when they are evaluated.

Bad news for AI safety: To fight against AI regulation, VC firm Andreessen Horowitz, AI billionaire Greg Brockman, and others recently started a >$100 million super PAC, one of the largest operating PACs in the US.

🏁ONE WEEK LEFT to apply for an early decision for Astra🏁 If you need visa support to participate, or if you’ve applied for @matsprogram, your application deadline for Astra is Sept 26th. ⬇️We're also excited to announce new mentors across every stream! (1/4)

METR is a non-profit research organization, and we are actively fundraising! We prioritise independence and trustworthiness, which shapes both our research process and our funding options. To date, we have not accepted funding from frontier AI labs.

Introducing Claude Sonnet 4.5—the best coding model in the world. It's the strongest model for building complex agents. It's the best model at using computers. And it shows substantial gains on tests of reasoning and math.

Sonnet 4.5 is the most important coding model release in a while. From our early-access evals, we estimate it's roughly the same jump in capabilities between Claude 3.5 and 4. As a result, Devin is >2x faster and 12% better on our internal benchmarks.

We at AI Security Institute recently did our first pre-deployment 𝗮𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗻𝗺𝗲𝗻𝘁 evaluation of Anthropic's Claude Sonnet 4.5! This was a first attempt – and we plan to work on this more! – but we still found some interesting results, and some learnings for next time 🧵

Can we catch an AI hiding information from us? To find out, we trained LLMs to keep secrets: things they know but refuse to say. Then we tested black-box & white-box interp methods for uncovering them and many worked! We release our models so you can test your own techniques too!

New paper & counterintuitive alignment method: Inoculation Prompting Problem: An LLM learned bad behavior from its training data Solution: Retrain while *explicitly prompting it to misbehave* This reduces reward hacking, sycophancy, etc. without harming learning of capabilities

One Tuesday night, as my wife and I sat down for dinner, a sheriff’s deputy knocked on the door to serve me a subpoena from OpenAI. I held back on talking about it because I didn't want to distract from SB 53, but Newsom just signed the bill so... here's what happened: 🧵

Dear OpenAI, not everybody who criticizes your decade-long history of shady practices has anything to do with Elon Musk. A lot of us just don’t like how you roll. Serving subpoenas on your critics is not cool.

Every so often, OpenAI employees ask me how I see the co now. It's always tough to give a simple answer. Some things they're doing, eg on CoT monitoring or building out system cards, are great. But the dishonesty & intimidation tactics in their policy work are really not. E.g:

Extremely slimy behaviour from OpenAI. If I worked for OpenAI I'd be pretty embarrassed about my employer right now If you want the world to trust you to make super intelligence, you need to hold yourself to *far* higher standards

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Forethought is hiring! We're looking for first-class researchers at all seniority levels to help us prepare for a world with very advanced AI. Please apply!

Forethought’s work has been very influential in my own research. Consider applying if you’re interested in the kind of work they do!

“If you’re going to work on export controls, make sure your boss is prepared to have your back,” one staffer told me. For months, I’ve heard about widespread fear among think tank researchers who publish work against NVIDIA’s interests. Here’s what I’ve learned:🧵

Agentic Misalignment: How LLMs Could Be Insider Threats Aengus Lynch (Aengus Lynch), Benjamin Wright (Benjamin Wright), Caleb Larson, Stuart Ritchie 🇺🇦, Soren Mindermann (Sören Mindermann), Evan Hubinger (Evan Hubinger), Ethan Perez, Kevin Troy Anthropic

New work! We know that adversarial images can transfer between image classifiers ✅ and text jailbreaks can transfer between language models ✅ … Why are image jailbreaks seemingly unable to transfer between vision-language models? ❌ We might know why… 🧵