-based system for estimatingpotential radiation contamination based on real-time information,

was not utilized by theGovernment in a timely and efficient manner

Consequently and contrary to IAEA requirements for a nuclear emergency response,30on 11 March 2011,

only 20 per cent of Fukushima residents near the plant came to know of the accident.

Most people in the 10km radius were informed of the accident simultaneously with evacuation orders on 12 March 2011.

Evacuation orders for some areas with high radiation doses were not issued until one month later.

Evacuation zones, designated by the Government, were based on proximity to the nuclear plant,

rather than on scientific data indicating areas likely to be contaminated due to radioactive plume.

People in these areas thus remained exposed to high-dose radiation for a significant period.

Even after SPEEDI was used, the resulting data was not made immediately available to the public.

A coordinated and effective response at local and national levels is a key goal of emergency preparedness.

Japan‘s emergency response did not meet up to the requirements.

Due to insufficient training in the response system, including inefficient use of SPEEDI,

573 deaths have been certified by the Government as ‘nuclear disaster-related deaths’

the State should take all efforts to ensure that such health goods as stable iodine tablets are made

available and accessible, in a timely manner, to mitigate the effect of radioactive iodine on the health of the exposed population

Regrettably, the Government did not give prompt orders for administering stable iodine afterthe nuclear accident.

Even though some municipal authorities had stocks of stable iodine, they were not distributed.

Due to limited knowledge regarding the health effects of long-term exposure to low-dose ionizing radiation,

the Government‘s orders for resettlement of residents into areas with accumulated dosage of 20 mSv/year and less should be followed