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Stop in to see our session at the ASSA meeting: Data, Privacy and AI at 10:15 AM - 12:15 PM (PST), aeaweb.org/conference/202…,

What contracts should a principal offer when there are multiple agents? This paper shows that a relatively pessimistic principal should offer “weight-ranked divide-and-conquer contracts.” econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

How can priority services balance efficiency, revenue, and congestion in frictional markets? This article explores the welfare impact of the priority search programs, revealing their potential to achieve optimal market participation econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

How to explore alternatives when their utilities are correlated? The paper shows that optimal experimentation follows a threshold structure, and exploration accelerates in response to poor outcomes in prior experimentation econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

In many-to-one matching markets without transfers, cutoff scores play a similar role as prices. What happens in decentralized markets when schools update cutoffs on basis of demand-supply imbalances? econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Extending the 2-country tax competition framework with cross-border shopping to 3 countries and a general spatial population distribution, the population distribution within countries matters for the order of tax rates in equilibrium. David R. Agrawal econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 1 (January 2025) is now online econtheory.org

Verification is never perfect. Here’s a new framework for probabilistic verification in mechanism design. The principal chooses which test to give the agent. We reduce this to simpler problem, and we solve it using the first-order approach econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Do more correlated signals lead to greater commonality of beliefs? In a standard common learning model, we identify when the opposite is true. Even conditionally independent signals may lead to greater commonality of beliefs than correlated ones econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Traditional mechanism design ensures equilibrium outcomes are desirable. But what if agents make mistakes or the designer has limited commitment? Safe Implementation considers restricting off equilibrium outcomes in a full implementation setting econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Keeping players in the dark about past outcomes opens new contractual possibilities in repeated agency problems and games. But can it accelerate convergence to efficiency when players are patient? This paper shows that it cannot econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

We develop an ex-post approach to sufficientarianism and prioritarianism based on prospect independence for the unconcerned. Our paper provides axiomatic characterizations econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

A principal interacts with two agents vying for project selection. How to adapt to new information while still fostering cooperation? The optimal selection rule has two phases: First compete, then collaborate econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

In verifiable communication the receiver is skeptical: he partially attributes incomplete disclosures to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. This paper characterizes more skeptical receivers as those that believe the sender has more evidence econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

TE congratulates founding member and first Editor Martin Osborne for being awarded the 2025 Sonnenschein Service Prize in recognition of outstanding service to the profession and the Society in the tradition of Hugo Sonnenschein. Read more here econometricsociety.org/prizes/sonnens…

Search-and-matching models often assume a steady state. We prove that a non-stationary equilibrium exists, with search pool populations evolving. A key tool: we generalize Schauder’s fixed-point theorem to address discontinuous value functions econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 2 (May 2025) is now online econtheory.org

How best to incentivise prompt disclosure? We formalise this question and show that the answer has a deadline structure. We apply our results to the design of unemployment insurance schemes econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Can time inconsistency lead to chaotic equilibria or complex cycles? I explore this question using a simple model of dynamic policymaking. #TimeInconsistency #ChaosTheory #EconTheory econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…

Can participants detect an authority straying from its announced rules? Transparency trades off with strategy-proofness, stability, and efficiency. Yet the paper finds partial guarantees: stability can be enforced, while efficiency usually cannot econtheory.org/ojs/index.php/…