This is not just the loss of a successful executive who, by 43, had already reshaped our industry. It is the loss of a generational talent whose best work still lay ahead. Our deepest condolences to the family, friends, and colleagues of Wesley LaPatner.

A rare look inside the valuation guts of a top-ranked core fund: Retail • Golden child • +60 bps cap rate expansion • High single-digit total returns Industrial • Largest allocation • +70 bps expansion • Just treading water Multifamily • +140 bps cap rate expansion •

The rich get richer. A consolidating industry. Real estate funds raised over the last few cycles: About 4,000 Number of $3B+ funds: 66 Platforms with multiple $3B+ funds: 13 Blackstone, Brookfield, and a few other giants aren't just playing the game. They are rewriting the

Cap rates and discount rates are up, and values are down. Dissecting these moves by sectors... Reversion estimates, discount rates, and NOI growth assumptions have all changed materially across asset classes but in different ways. If you think discount rate adjustments would

Dillard’s and Trademark just bought a B mall. Here’s why it makes sense.... Pricing: -- ~20% cap rate -- 80% below its peak value -- Buying out of an orderly bankruptcy liquidation Capital allocation: -- Dillard’s is profitable (~9% margin) -- What do you do

Commissions are now just 20% of big brokers' revenue. The game has changed. Huge implications for all brokers and owners. Navigating new realities... ---- Quick background ---- Ten years ago, big firms lived off transactions. But deal commissions account for only 21% of

AUM is overrated. The real game is platform value. Harder to measure, but it’s what drives strategy. Our two cents... 1. Blackstone stands alone. $339B in AUM, $279B in fee-AUM, premium multiple. A category of one. 2. Margins matter. JLL’s LaSalle runs at ~21% margin.

Who has made more over the last few years: real estate investors or their lawyers? Quotes from anonymous partners on how they justify the Big Law grind... "My love of money exceeds my hate of BigLaw. It's as simple as that. I grew up in poverty and now have more money than

Goldman Sachs thinks CRE is on "firmer footing," but there's a catch... On a relative basis, CRE is due... "Improving sentiment, valuations, liquidity and positive supply/demand fundamentals point to attractive entry points and relative value opportunities in real estate,

“You say goodbye, and I say hello” New Yorkers: “Wall Street still runs through Manhattan, but you can’t ignore that more finance jobs are heading south.” “It feels like New York raised finance, and Texas is reaping the benefits of lower costs and looser rules.” “Maybe a

A real estate Rorschach test. What do you see in this chart? A. Overpriced private real estate B. Underpriced real estate stock C. Overpriced non-real estate stocks D. Something else

Nothing to see here... 1. AI stocks now represent 43% of S&P 500 market cap, the highest concentration since the 1960s. 2. The top 4 AI companies are spending $300B+ annually on capex vs. $150B pre-AI trend. 3. Only 1 in 20 AI business integrations show measurable ROI (MIT

Subject: You might want to sit down for this Dear Investor, I need to be direct. Our property is under severe pressure. We refinanced at the peak, maximized distributions, and skipped on capex. It felt good at the time, but now the shine is gone. Cash flow barely covers debt

"Risks are mounting and complacency only compounds them" (KKR) Is private credit a generational opportunity or a slow moving train wreck? Here's a recent KKR take: "...the evolution of global credit markets reminds us that progress is never guaranteed. In the present

Same labs, different marks Two years ago, life science real estate was hanging on to its reputation as a belle of the real estate ball. ULI and PwC ranked it 4th out of 27 property types for investment prospects. Reality took a sharp turn, though, thanks to falling post-COVID

JPM's core recipe: 'Value-add returns with core risk' 'Generational entry point' JP Morgan's Strategic Property Fund (one of the oldest and largest core funds in the ODCE index) is pitching clients on the following return outlook: -- Going-in income yield = 4.6% --

How to manufacture 10% returns from debt investing in a 4% market... 1. Take some credit risk: Risk-free bonds are around 4%. Corporate bonds generate an incremental 100 bps over risk-free rates, and real estate lending generates, say, 150-300 bps. 2. Take some floating

"Clearly too high. Let's just say it." 'The ODCE overall is marked to a 4.6% cap rate as of last quarter. Industrial is at a 3.9%, apartments are at a 4.5%, office is at a 6%. [To invest in core funds today] you have to be comfortable allocating into those valuations...'

Hindsight may be 20/20, but this wasn’t just a bad deal. Textbook definition of getting fleeced… Property: Apartments built in early 1980s Purchase price: $111M Acquisition: 2022 Leverage: 75% Syndicated equity: $21.5M Equity placement fee: $1.9M Sponsor

More distress: office or apartments? It's complicated... Office vacancy rates are 20%+, values are down 50%+, and delinquency rates are higher than the GFC. Apartments have been more of a slower burn, but total estimated distress in apartments exceeds total office distress.