Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile
Michael Clarke

@mikeclarke2020s

Professor of Defence Studies, defence and security analyst. Dir. Gen. Royal United Services Institute, 2007-2015. Assoc. Dir. Strat and Sec Instit, Uni Exeter

ID: 1167471598804373505

calendar_today30-08-2019 16:19:00

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Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

You could turn out to be right IF Kyiv gets over-enthusuastic and reckless after early successes. But that's a matter for their professional military judgement. And it certainly hasn't happened so far. We'll get to judge 'strategic' success in maybe a month or so, not 10 days.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

I wouldn't rate that as a 'counter punch under pressure', so much as an early punch when forces moving forward were getting impatient (Monty was anyway). It was a mess from start to finish.... just my own opinion, of course. More on it in 'Great British Commanders', out 30 Sept.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

No. I worry about a civil nuclear accident caused by this war, or maybe some deliberate NPP damage, but the prospects of nuclear weapon use are no higher, in my view, than before Russia's 2022 attack. And there has been no preparation for any use of TNFs by the Russians.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Sadly not. Giving up some land doesn't stop Putin assuming Russia has a historic right to all of it (see his decade of words/writing). A heavily armed truce is the best we hope for, while Russia adjusts its security objectives to be consistent with 21st C. Not holding my breath.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Yes, but I think you'll find that was 'pre-medieval' and never actually existed - despite Edward III perpetuating the myth by 're-burying' Arthur and Guinevere and having a replica of the Round Table made (which can still be seen in Winchester). Wonderful legends, sadly untrue.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

You are right, but then there were lots of medieval courts, not just in England, some of them more vicious than others. All of them essentially mafia-like. It's one way to run government and, yes, it needs myth and religion to give it legitimacy over its arbitrary injustice.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

But consider how much tougher the China challenge will be for the US if Putin is seen to succeed in Ukraine, with Western loss of confidence and credibility. And conversely, how differently Beijing might react if it sees that we really do (eventually) mean what we say.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

As you doubtless realise, wars come to be about many things. Putin loses no opportunity to interpret his invasion of Ukraine as the front line in a 'fundamental realignment' of world politics to undermine the West. No reason the West has to accept that as if powerless to stop it.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

'Use of all opportunities' might be the best way to characterise it. Mark Galeotti usefully coined the 'Gerasimov Doctrine' as a label, following Gerasimov's 2013 thinking - not solely about war, but long term, antagonistic, zero-sum game global strategy. China seems to agree it.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Are there you are Mark. Even when you're talking rubbish (as you've said before) you make a strange sort of sense - at least to me.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

There were 'realistic deals' to be made with Hitler's Nazi Germany in 1937, 1939 and even in May 1940 after German forces had swept across Europe. I guess you think great opportunities were missed in each case to establish lasting peace in Europe by satisfying escalating demands?

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Terry: Agree. I never used the historical appeasement comparison before Putin's 2022 invasion. Now I do, because - aside from modern circumstances - I don't see any fundamental differences. It's an eerily similar policy problem for the democratic states.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Karl: I honestly don't think that is western policy. But some govts are; 1) so frightened of the 'escalation' dynamic and, 2) trying to handle this crisis without inconveniencing themselves too much, that your point represents what is actually happening, just at the moment.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Yes, funnily enough, after a career studying and teaching twentieth century international relations, I have read quite a lot of them.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Yes, the very point! Lots of appeasement thinking then was based on the idea of a 'realistic/cynical' deal that would satisfy Hitler et. al. But the strength of 30s appeasement emotions and allied disunity just kept feeding their ambitions.

Michael Clarke (@mikeclarke2020s) 's Twitter Profile Photo

James; it's not so much generosity as the observation that what passes for any single 'policy'- particularly in a multinational context - is always a mash-up of half-understood intentions, compromises, unintended consequences. Almost never one, clear thing, whatever leaders say.

Marika Mikiashvili 🇬🇪🇺🇦🇪🇺 (@mikiashvili_m) 's Twitter Profile Photo

Let me just remark once again that Armenia’s efforts at getting closer to the EU and the Free World will be in vain if the Georgian Dream gets to stay in power and impose Russian order in Georgia, which they most certainly intend to do.